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1The global financial crisis that emerged in 2007, and intensified in 2008, has turned into a major worldwide economic downturn more serious than any since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The financial and economic crisis has seen considerable debate 
about its origins and consequences, as well as the responses of policymakers. 
The crisis raises important issues about the role of markets and governments 
in the allocation of capital and the regulation of financial institutions.
Australia went into the economic crisis better placed than most 
countries. However, as a small and open economy integrated into the 
world’s capital markets, Australia cannot expect to escape the financial and 
economic issues confronting other countries.
The Centre for Independent Studies initiated a series of Crisis 
Commentary events, beginning in November 2008, with a roundtable 
discussion of the global ban on short selling stocks. Subsequent events 
addressed the federal government’s renewed use of activist fiscal policy 
and other policy responses to the crisis. These events aim to provide 
CIS members and the general public with access to alternative perspectives 
on the crisis that are otherwise less well represented in the public debate.
The Crisis Commentary events have provided the basis for considerable 
media coverage for CIS. The aim of the publications in the Crisis 
Commentary series is to give these perspectives even wider currency and 
to serve as a reference for those interested in some of the many important 
issues raised by these events.
This volume collects the contributions to the roundtable on short selling 
held at the Centre on 12 November 2008. The contributions by Robert 
Bianchi and Stephen Kirchner have been updated in light of subsequent 
developments. John Green’s paper is unrevised.
Stephen Kirchner
Research Fellow
The Centre for Independent Studies
Crisis Commentary Series—Introduction 
Stephen Kirchner 

3Shooting the Messenger: The Political 
Economy of Short Selling  
Stephen Kirchner
Bans on short selling financial stocks were implemented in a number of stock markets around the world at the end of September 2008.In Australia, a ban on ‘naked’ short selling (see below for 
definition) was announced by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) on Friday, 19 September, to take effect from the 
following Monday. Over the weekend, however, ASIC changed its mind. 
On Sunday, it announced that the ban would also extend to covered 
short sales of all listed stocks for a period of 30 days. In announcing the 
decision, ASIC said:
Recent market global conditions, coupled with extensive 
short selling of stocks, particularly financial stocks, may be 
causing unwarranted price fluctuations. These fluctuations 
if unchecked, threaten the operation of fair and orderly 
stock markets.
Despite ASIC’s concern with ‘fair and orderly stock markets,’ 
its implementation of the ban was chaotic, resulting in considerable 
uncertainty for financial market participants. By Tuesday, 23 September, 
ASIC had to review and further clarify its weekend announcement. 
In order to address the widespread unintended consequences of the ban, 
it announced that the ban on covered short selling would not apply 
to some market-making activities, the hedging of pre-September 22 
positions by market-makers, arbitrage transactions involving dual-
listed entities, sales resulting from the exercise of options, and index 
arbitrage transactions that were deemed ‘unlikely to be a mechanism 
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for market abuse.’ At the same time, ASIC warned that ‘the exemptions 
may change,’ providing no certainty to the market.
Date Landmarks
21 October 2008 ASIC extends ban on covered short selling of  non-financial securities until 18 November 2008
21 October 2008 ASIC extends ban on short selling financial stocks until 27 January 2009
13 November 2008 ASIC lifts ban on covered short selling of  non-financial stocks from 19 November 2008
13 November 2008 ASIC retains ban on short selling financials
8 October 2008 US lifts ban on short selling designated financials
16 January 2009 UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) lifts ban on short selling designated financials
21 January 2009 ASIC extends ban on short selling financials until  6 March 2009
5 March 2009 ASIC extends ban on short selling financials until 31 May 2009 
25 May 2009 ASIC lifts ban on short selling financials
The ban on short selling stocks lasted much longer in Australia than 
in other countries. It was also much more comprehensive in scope, 
including all listed stocks and not just designated financials.
Australia was already a price-taker in global capital markets, but it 
seems we have become a price-taker in regulation as well. The main 
argument advanced in Australia for both the short selling ban and 
depositor protection arrangements is that other countries are doing it 
too, and we cannot afford to be left out on a regulatory limb.
The Australian government seems to fear a form reverse regulatory 
arbitrage in which capital flees from less regulated to more highly 
regulated markets and financial institutions. These concerns are 
probably exaggerated, but the Australian government was not interested 
in carrying out an experiment to find out what would happen if we did 
not match what other countries were doing.
Of course, in the case of the bank deposits’ guarantee, the Australian 
government managed to turn an apprehended run on the banks into a 
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real run on other investment vehicles not covered by the guarantee, 
a classic case of the unintended consequences that often accompany 
distortions to financial markets.
If the bans on short selling equities in Australia and a number of 
other countries were designed to curtail downside volatility in equity 
markets, then it is not obvious from subsequent price action in these 
markets that the bans have been a success on their own terms.
After the short selling bans were introduced, there was a reduction in 
liquidity in equity markets and, not surprisingly, an increase in volatility. 
Stock prices continued to post new lows until March 2009.
There is a significant asymmetry in the attitude of both investors 
and managers of firms to price action in equity securities. Rising 
share prices are seen as vindicating the brilliance and insight of the 
individual investor as well as being the well-deserved return to superior 
management. Falling share prices, by contrast, are invariably attributed 
to dark, irrational and mysterious forces, if not an outright conspiracy 
against the investing public.
It is not hard to see why short selling has never won any popularity 
contests—the short seller profits from other people’s mistakes.
Short sellers have been described as the investigative journalists of 
capital markets, exposing failed business models, bad management, and 
excessive leverage.
Long before the failure of Lehman Brothers, a hedge fund blogger 
based in London ran a reader poll on the financial institutions mostly 
like to fail. Lehman Brothers won that poll by a large margin. It is 
no accident that some of the Australian companies that were targets of 
short selling in the context of the financial crisis were the companies 
with the greatest exposure to the United States, as well as being the most 
highly levered. Speculative short selling is not random market or herd-
like behaviour: it is typically highly selective, very well informed, and 
based firmly on fundamentals.
Prohibiting short selling is analogous to silencing investigative 
journalism, an attack on the free speech of the marketplace.
Short selling is the sale of a security the seller does not own, and it 
is this somewhat counterintuitive notion that arouses a lot of suspicion 
and hostility against short selling.
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Some people go so far as to claim that short selling is a fraudulent 
activity, although short selling is something that happens in markets for 
goods and services all the time.
Many sellers of goods and services do not own a good or service at 
the time of entering into a contract to supply that good or service at an 
agreed price. They may also be short on the necessary inputs to make 
good on that supply. To the extent that the suppliers have leverage on 
their balance sheet, they may also be borrowing to make good on the 
transaction. So the suppliers are in a sense betting that they can go into 
the marketplace and buy what they need to deliver on the transaction at 
a lower cost than the price agreed with the buyer.
In share markets, selling a security one doesn’t own is facilitated by a 
market for lending securities. The short seller enters into a contractual 
arrangement to borrow securities from a securities lender, which are 
then sold, but the short seller must eventually cover the short position 
by buying back those securities in the market and delivering them to 
the lender.
The distinction between covered and uncovered (or naked) short 
selling comes down to whether such a lending arrangement is in place 
at the time the securities are sold by the short seller, but even uncovered 
short sellers must eventually buy back their position.
There is an increased risk that an uncovered short sale isn’t settled, 
which is why regulators typically take a tougher approach to naked short 
selling. But from an economic point of view, there is little to distinguish 
covered from uncovered short selling.
One way to think about short selling is a short-run increase in 
the supply of a security, which all else being equal, we would expect 
to depress the price of that security. It should also be noted that in 
Australia, naked short selling was notionally subject to an ‘up-tick’ rule, 
which prevents a short sale from being made at a price below that of the 
immediately preceding sale.
But if we hold everything else constant, then a short sale by itself 
cannot permanently depress the price of a security. As soon as the seller 
covers the short position, the supply curve for that security shifts back 
to its original position, the former price is restored, and the short seller 
is out of pocket for their transactions costs.
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The only way a short seller can profit from a short sale is to correctly 
anticipate a future fall in demand for the security that is entirely 
independent of the increase in supply brought about by the short sale. 
Only if future demand falls can the short seller hope to buy back the 
security at a lower price and make a profit. Of course, future demand 
for the security could just as easily increase, so that short sellers have to 
buy back their position at a higher price, resulting in a loss.
It may well be the case that short selling has the effect of bringing 
forward a future fall in demand, because the fall in price induced by the 
short sale may squeeze out ‘weak hands’ holding the stock. The weakest 
hands are often leveraged, speculative buyers. The leverage employed 
on both the buy and sell side of the market serves to increase market 
liquidity and facilitate price discovery, but it in no sense determines 
market prices.
Short selling actually exercises a stabilising influence on the market 
because it is after a share price has fallen that short sellers step in to buy 
back their positions and take their profits. The phrase ‘short covering 
rally’ refers to a situation where prices go up because of short sellers 
buying back their positions.
Milton Friedman wrote a classic defence of the role of speculation 
in financial markets.1 Friedman was talking about foreign exchange 
markets and arguing in favour of flexible exchange rates, but the same 
arguments apply in the context of other markets. Friedman observed 
that speculation is inherently stabilising because the speculator can 
only profit by buying low and selling high, driving prices towards their 
equilibrium value. To argue that speculation is inherently destabilising 
is the same as arguing that speculators lose money. No doubt there are 
speculators who lose money, but they tend not to survive very long.
The Austrian School economist Ludwig von Mises, also talking in the 
context of foreign exchange markets, described the role of speculation 
in these terms:
Speculation does not determine prices; it has to accept the 
prices that are determined in the market. Its efforts are 
directed to correctly estimating future price-situations and 
to acting accordingly. The influence of speculation cannot 
alter the average level of prices over a given period; what it 
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can do is diminish the gap between the highest and lowest 
prices. Price fluctuations are reduced by speculation, not 
aggravated, as the popular legend has it.
Accordingly, Mises described the suppression of speculation as ‘the 
lowest form of demagogy … the resource of governments in search 
of a scapegoat.’2
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that short selling is the 
exclusive preserve of speculators. It is also widely used as a hedging 
tool. Speculation and hedging activity are found on both the long and 
short side of all markets, and both are essential to the liquidity that 
facilitates price discovery. For example, fund managers will often use 
short selling to their hedge equity exposures, protecting their investors 
against downside risk.
Much of the damage that has been inflicted on financial markets 
through restrictions on short selling stems from the way it has disrupted 
these hedging strategies. As their name implies, hedge funds are often 
focused on taking both long and short positions that aim to be neutral 
with respect to overall market movements. The ban on short selling 
interferes with the viability of these strategies and, indeed, the viability 
of the funds themselves.
One of the noteworthy aspects of the financial crisis is that hedge 
funds, which have been among the most lightly regulated sectors of 
financial markets, fared relatively well in the crisis, at least until the 
short selling bans came in. The ban on short selling caused some hedge 
funds considerable problems and threatened to open up a whole new 
dimension to the credit crisis, one that was policy induced.
Fund managers have been forced to liquidate long positions in 
equities that can no longer be hedged, while some of the short-side 
interest in equities was diverted into the even less transparent derivatives 
markets, which are not subject to short selling restrictions.
Like any other technology, short selling can be abused. For example, 
in the United States, it is not unusual to observe a significant increase 
in short interest in a stock ahead of litigation being launched against 
the company in question. It is pretty obvious what sort of game is being 
played here. The expression ‘rumourtrage’ has been coined to describe 




However, the same opportunities for manipulation exist on the long 
side of the market. For example, in the so-called ‘pump and dump’ 
strategy, a company is talked-up after its shares have been bought by 
the market manipulator, then sold at higher prices to subsequent buyers 
who get taken in by the hype.
Of course, relatively few investors or managers of firms complain 
when speculative buying is driving up their share prices. They are often 
more than happy to go along for the ride.
Market manipulation is more likely to be successful in markets 
that lack depth and liquidity, and restrictions on short selling serve to 
reduce liquidity. Market manipulation is asserted far more often than it 
is proved. Speculative short selling is typically highly selective and well-
informed. The targets of short selling often have something to hide.
Market manipulation is already illegal and best dealt with directly 
rather than by putting in place restrictions that undermine market 
liquidity and price discovery. There are other regulatory responses to deal 
with market manipulation, such as increased disclosure requirements, 
which are better able to handle these issues.
It has also been suggested that fund managers who facilitate short 
selling by lending their securities are somehow acting against the 
interests of their investors. Since fund managers attract and retain 
customers by maximising long-run returns, it seems implausible 
that they would knowingly facilitate transactions that reduce overall 
returns. It is also worth recalling that fund managers are buyers as well 
as holders of equity, and falling share prices may afford them buying 
opportunities that enhance overall returns to their investors.
If securities lending for the purpose of short selling were not in the 
interest of investors, then fund managers could attract investors by 
undertaking not to engage in it, taking business away from other fund 
managers, which would in turn compensate for the loss of securities 
lending fees.
Short selling did not bring about the recent turmoil in financial 
markets. Indeed, if greater short selling opportunities had existed in 
a broader range of markets, such as real estate, short sellers may well 




It is worth recalling that there was at least one proprietary trading 
operation by a major US investment bank that actively shorted the 
market in structured debt products at the height of the credit market 
boom. We needed more such speculative shorts, not less.
Ultimately, companies don’t go bust because their share price falls. 
Rather, causality runs the other way. Share prices fall because companies 
go bust. Short sellers certainly capitalise on corporate and investor 
misfortune, but they do not cause it.
As much as regulators, shareholders and management might try to 
shoot the messenger, it is generally better for investors and markets that 
the short seller’s message is heard sooner rather than later.
Endnotes
1 Milton Friedman, ‘In Defence of Destabilising Speculation,’ in The Optimum 
Quantity of Money and Other Essays (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).
2 Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1953), 253.
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Short sellers:  
Financial Detectives or Villains? 
Robert J. Bianchi
Introduction
The controversial concept of short selling has raised debate between 
short sellers and government regulators for many centuries.1 Some argue 
that short sellers are financial detectives who identify overvalued assets 
and transmit negative information into the markets when they short sell 
securities. Others argue that short sellers are villains who manipulate 
asset prices downwards through opportunistic bear raids on individual 
companies. In September 2008, government regulators around the 
world shone a light on these market participants when they imposed 
various types of short selling bans across many stock exchanges.
In this short paper, we review the role of short sellers. Was the 2008 
short selling ban justified in saving stock exchanges around the world? 
How did the ban affect markets? We examine the theory and empirics 
of short selling and their market effects. Lastly, we assess the policy 
decisions of the 2008 short selling ban and evaluate the empirical 
lessons learnt.
Primer on short selling
Short sellers are market participants who develop a view that an asset 
price is expected to decline. Short sellers wish to benefit from this 
opinion although they do not possess legal or economic ownership of 
the asset. To profit from this pessimistic outlook (and for this negative 
information to be transmitted in the market), short sellers must dispose 
of an asset they do not currently own in one of two ways. The first is 
‘covered short selling,’ which refers to the practice of borrowing the 
asset from a counterparty (i.e. a stock lender) prior to the short seller 
disposing the security for cash in the market. The short seller generally 
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lodges the cash from the short sale as collateral to the stock lender. The 
second type of transaction is ‘naked short selling,’ which is the practice 
of the short seller disposing the asset for cash in the market with no 
certainty that the transaction will be settled. This is because the short 
seller has not yet borrowed the asset from a stock lender at the time 
of the short sale transaction. Naked short sale transactions sometimes 
fail because the security is unable to be borrowed and delivered to the 
exchange at settlement date. With an understanding of the mechanics 
of this transaction, we now review the theory of short selling and its 
benefits of enhancing market efficiency and price discovery.
The rationale for short selling
The theoretical contribution of short selling can be highlighted by 
reviewing the mechanics of markets. The function of a market is to 
act as an auctioneer that aggregates the desires of all buyers and sellers. 
The market as the auctioneer then sets an equilibrium price to clear 
the market. The prevailing market price is set based on the assumption 
that all the buyers and sellers in the market are present. The theory of 
information symmetry informs us that markets are efficiently priced 
when buyers with positive information and sellers with negative 
information meet in the market to form the aggregate opinion of the 
value of the security, which is fully reflected in the equilibrium price. 
The theory of short selling obviously examines the sellers in the market 
and considers their market implications when they are restricted from 
participating.
The first theoretical benefit of short sellers is they increase the supply 
of a security by the amount of outstanding short positions, which 
results in a lower market price.2 This effect facilitates negative opinion 
in markets, which tempers any excessive overpricing of securities. 
The collective action of all available information, both positive and 
negative, leads to symmetric information in the market, which results 
in more efficient market pricing. Other theorists argue that short 
selling constraints create asymmetrical effects on market information, 
where optimistic market expectations are weighted more heavily than 
pessimistic opinions. As a result, short selling restrictions cause an 
upward bias in asset prices.3
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The second theoretical element of short selling is its contribution 
to price discovery. The concept of price discovery involves the 
incorporation of new information into asset prices. Markets serve as a 
central location for the price discovery process of many capital market 
securities and instruments. The introduction of short sellers allows their 
negative information to be transmitted immediately in the market, 
thereby, resulting in more efficient asset prices. Theorists argue that 
constraining short selling reduces the speed of price adjustment to 
negative information.4
Overall, the theory of short selling suggests that these market 
participants provide a valuable contribution to efficient markets and 
price discovery. The negative information from short sellers enhances 
the informational efficiency of asset prices, and the arrival of this 
information causes the adjustment of prices to fully reflect all available 
information as quickly as possible. The theory also suggests that short 
selling restrictions lead to information asymmetry, impair market 
efficiency, and cause delays in the price discovery process. Current 
empirical findings confirming the detrimental impact of one-sided 
information in markets is considered in the following section.
Empirical evidence
Many empirical studies over the past 30 years have demonstrated 
evidence of the benefits of short selling behaviour across various stock 
exchanges. Empirical research has shown that short selling behaviour 
creates important negative information that enhances market efficiency, 
price discovery, and liquidity. One of the first empirical studies 
demonstrated that S&P500 stock prices remain excessively higher 
than justified when short sellers are constrained from markets.5 Put 
simply, short selling constraints reduce market efficiency resulting in 
buyers purchasing securities at overinflated prices. To support this, 
subsequent research has estimated that US stocks that are expensive 
to short generally exhibit high valuations and low subsequent 
returns.6 Another empirical study found that short sellers are skilled at 
identifying US stocks with lower than expected future returns.7
Empirical researchers have also examined the role of short sellers in 
the price discovery process. These studies have demonstrated that short 
sellers contribute to a near instantaneous adjustment in market prices, 
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while securities with short selling restrictions exhibit delays in the 
speed of adjustment to the true valuation of the security. For instance, 
an Australian ASX study estimated that the negative information 
from a short sale is transmitted in the market within 15 minutes of 
the transaction.8 Most recently, a comprehensive study of 46 countries 
shows that restricting short selling inhibits downward price discovery.9
The third rationale of short selling behaviour is its important 
contribution to market liquidity. Studies demonstrate that short sellers 
enhance liquidity by selling stocks into rising markets.10 Other research 
suggests that short sellers behave as liquidity providers by short selling 
stocks as prices rise and reducing short positions as prices decline.11 
Empirical studies show that the introduction of short sellers tends to 
increase the number of potential sellers and buyers in the market, which 
increases trading volume, reduces transaction costs, and benefits all 
investors. The contribution to liquidity by short sellers is important to 
investors as it causes an appreciation of a company’s stock price relative 
to stocks that are less liquid as investors demand a lower risk premium 
for stocks that are more liquid.
Empirical studies demonstrate that short sellers do not amplify price 
declines but rather align prices to their fundamental value and do not 
push prices below their true valuation.12 A review of three decades of 
empirical evidence demonstrates that short selling causes downward 
adjustments of asset prices to their fundamental value; however, there 
is no empirical evidence to suggest that they sell asset prices below their 
intrinsic value. In short, empirical studies do not support the notion 
that short sellers manipulate markets or accentuate price declines. 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that short selling restrictions create 
market inefficiencies by biasing prices upwards, thereby, causing buyers 
of securities to pay more than the true market value of an asset. In light 
of these findings, it is clear that short selling restrictions create distorted 
outcomes that are inconsistent with the intention of government 
regulation designed to enhance market efficiency and price discovery. It 
is in this context that we review the events of September 2008, a time 
that will be remembered as one of the most dramatic periods in the 
annals of financial history.
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The events of September 2008
Markets began the 2008 calendar year in a fragile state with global credit 
markets in difficulty as investors began to understand the impact of 
the US subprime mortgage crisis. Credit markets became dysfunctional 
in March 2008 when the Wall Street investment bank Bear Stearns 
was unable to continue operations and was forced to merge with the 
US bank and financial institution JP Morgan Chase. As credit markets 
continued to freeze, the dramatic events of September 2008 unfolded 
on an unprecedented scale.
The unusual government intervention in American Insurance Group 
(AIG) was the result of mammoth mortgage guarantor exposures by the 
company, which would have resulted in a potential systemic failure if 
AIG became insolvent. On 17 September, the share price of Wall Street 
investment bank Morgan Stanley fell 24% to $21.75 and traded as 
low as $16.08. John Mack, CEO of Morgan Stanley, wrote an internal 
memo to employees stating:
What’s happening out there? It’s very clear to me—we’re 
in the midst of a market controlled by fear and rumors, 
and short sellers are driving our stock down.13
It is in these volatile financial market conditions that government 
regulators around the world imposed the 2008 short selling ban. 




Table 1 Financial milestones in September 2008
Date Country Event
7 September 2008 US Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac placed in conservatorship
13–1 September 2008 US Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. files for bankruptcy
16 September 2008 US
Fed Reserve announces the $85 
billion credit facility for AIG in return 
for 79.9% of the company’s equity
19 September 2008 UK
Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
prohibits short selling in financial 
companies
19 September 2008 US
Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) prohibits short selling in financial 
companies
19 September 2008 Germany
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
(BaFin) prohibits short selling in 
financial companies
19 September 2008 France
Autorite Des Marches Financiers 
(AMF) prohibits short selling in 
financial companies
19 September 2008 Australia
Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) bans short selling 
of all companies
In response to these market conditions, national government 
regulators announced a string of short selling bans on the 19 September 
2008. The rationale for the short selling ban was to remove short 
sellers from the market as they were blamed for the precipitous falls 
in the preceding days. The statement released by the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 19 September 2008 detailed its 
rationale for the short selling ban.
The Commission is committed to using every weapon 
in its arsenal to combat market manipulation that 
threatens investors and capital markets. The emergency 
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order temporarily banning short selling of financial stocks 
will restore equilibrium to markets. This action, which 
would not be necessary in a well-functioning market, is 
temporary in nature and part of the comprehensive set of 
steps being taken by the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and 
the Congress.14 [emphasis added]
The above statement claims that market manipulation by short 
sellers was the first motivation for the short selling ban. This is a serious 
claim that deserves to be supported by evidence from the SEC as 
empirical research shows that short sellers are not market manipulators. 
To date, the SEC has not provided empirical evidence to the public to 
support its claim that markets were being manipulated by short sellers. 
The 19 September 2008 SEC statement continues to detail the second 
rationale for the short selling ban.
Under normal market conditions, short selling contributes 
to price efficiency and adds liquidity to the markets. 
At present, it appears that unbridled short selling is 
contributing to the recent, sudden price declines in the 
securities of financial institutions unrelated to true price 
valuation. Financial institutions are particularly vulnerable 
to this crisis of confidence and panic selling because they 
depend on the confidence of their trading counterparties 
in the conduct of their core business.15 [emphasis added]
The second justification for the short selling ban was the 
US regulator’s view that the sudden price declines were unrelated to 
true price valuation. To date, the SEC has not disclosed empirical 
evidence to support its claims that market prices in September 2008 
did not reflect their true valuation. This is further supported by the fact 
that global equity markets did not reach their lowest levels until mid-
March 2009, six months after the introduction of the short selling ban. 
In light of this, we can conclude that the US SEC short selling ban can be 
discredited due to the lack of empirical evidence to support its claims.
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At the time, other government regulators followed the US and 
UK short sale bans in order to avoid the possibility of concentrated 
short selling on stock exchanges that permitted short sales. One of 
the fascinating policy decisions enacted on 19 September 2008 came 
from the Australian regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC), which imposed a total short selling ban on all 
Australian publicly listed companies. The total ban on all Australian 
stocks was much stronger in comparison to their US, UK, German, 
and French regulatory counterparts who imposed short selling bans on 
financial and/or insurance companies only. ASIC media releases 08-
204, 08-205 and 08-210 clearly state that ASIC’s short selling ban was 
designed to be temporary; however, the ban on financial securities was 
not lifted until 25 May 2009. ASIC’s rationale for the total short selling 
ban was to maintain fair and orderly markets given the relatively small 
size of the Australian market.16 If the small size of the Australian public 
equity market was a genuine concern, then regulators of other small 
markets would also impose total short selling bans. In September 2008, 
other comparable markets of similar size such as Ireland and Canada 
imposed short selling bans on financial stocks only and did not resort 
to a total short sale ban.
Subsequent to September 2008, history shows that the sell-off in 
world equity markets continued after the global coordinated short 
selling ban was introduced. In fact, most public equity markets did 
not trade to their lowest price levels until mid-March 2009. It is clear 
that the short selling ban did not stop the decline in the valuation of 
financial stocks. If short sellers are not to blame for the decline in equity 
market prices, then who is?
Explanations for the September 2008 sell-off
In complex financial markets, short sellers are akin to forensic 
accountants who search and trawl for overvalued companies and 
industry sectors. Like swimming against the tide, the short seller goes 
against the traditional bullish sentiment of the markets. Because of this 
contrarian nature, corporate managers of publicly listed companies 
lament this important role of short sellers. Short sellers critique 
corporate management and their capital budgeting decisions. Short 
sellers examine the weaknesses of business models and they tend to 
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focus on the risks of the cashflows of a business. When publicly listed 
companies are estimated to be overpriced, short sellers enter the market 
with the expectation that stock prices will decline.
The September 2008 stock market crunch can be readily explained 
by the finance theories of capital structure with bankruptcy risk, 
portfolio theory, and asset pricing.17 These foundations of finance can 
easily provide the rationale for the events of September 2008 that seem 
to confound and confuse government regulators and even CEOs of 
Wall Street investment banks. Modern portfolio theory and the theory 
of capital structure with bankruptcy risk inform us that investments or 
capital projects that are debt financed result in higher rates of return 
in the good times and higher levels of risk in the bad times. In an 
environment where debt financing was impossible due to frozen credit 
markets in September 2008, it was expected that public equity prices 
would decline.
The decision by many financial institutions and publicly listed 
companies to adopt highly leveraged balance sheets in the lead up to 
2008 was never the design of short sellers. In Australia, short sellers 
identified the excessive reliance of debt financing in the capital structures 
of recently failed companies, including ABC Learning Centres and 
Allco Finance. Recent history has shown that short sellers have correctly 
identified overvalued companies, including the famous names of Enron, 
Tyco and Worldcom. The role of short sellers cannot be underestimated 
as they were the first to signal the troubles of these companies through 
their short selling activities.
Short sellers have been unfairly demonised and blamed for the decline 
in equity prices in 2008. The fall in equities was driven by market forces 
and led by companies whose capital structure was heavily reliant on 
debt finance. Many banks and other publicly listed companies were the 
most highly leveraged institutions of all. As the credit markets became 
dysfunctional in 2007–08, the risks associated with highly geared 
balance sheets were factored into the value of equities. Short sellers have 
been inappropriately blamed for the excessive risk taking and misfortune 
of corporate managers of some Australian and overseas publicly listed 
companies. Strong companies with sound business models and a lower 
reliance on debt finance will continue to prosper over the long term. 
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It is these well-managed companies that short sellers have not targeted 
as they are not overvalued entities.
Many industry professionals, regulators and academics have failed 
to understand that there is a tendency for investors to form a severely 
negative view on a company’s stock valuation given a highly leveraged 
business model and when credit markets subsequently become frozen. 
Despite criticism from some circles, the theories of capital structure with 
bankruptcy risk, portfolio theory, and asset pricing have been successful 
in explaining investor behaviour during these recent turbulent times.18
Subsequent empirical research
Since September 2008, researchers have examined the market impact 
of these short selling bans during this unique period in finance history. 
A London Stock Exchange (LSE) study found that stocks with short 
sales bans exhibited significantly wider bid-ask spreads, deterioration 
of market depth, and decreased volume in comparison to control 
stocks.19 The study also demonstrated that in the period subsequent 
to the short selling ban, LSE stocks witnessed a statistically significant 
deterioration of liquidity that was not attributable to market-wide 
factors such as increased volatility. Another study in the United States 
revealed severe degradation in market quality as estimated by spreads, 
price impacts, and intraday volatility as a result of the US short selling 
ban.20 A third study in Australia estimated that ASX liquidity decreased 
with rising volatility in September–October 2008.21 This resulted in the 
impairment of the price discovery process, causing increased costs and 
market inefficiency.
Contrary to the above, an opposing study argues that the short 
selling bans did not affect the distribution of returns of US, UK, French, 
German, Swedish, and Japanese stocks in the September–October 2008 
period.22 Whilst this may be statistically valid, the study ignores the 
impact on transaction costs and liquidity, which were the primary 
metrics considered in other studies.
Overall, these post-September 2008 empirical studies continue to 
support the role of short selling in enhancing market efficiency and 
price discovery. The September 2008 short selling ban was a direct cost 
to market participants imposed by government regulators. Furthermore, 
government regulators have failed to disclose direct empirical evidence 
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to support their claim of market manipulation or mispricing by short 
sellers during this period. In the absence of this evidence, we can conclude 
that there was no fundamental or genuine basis for the introduction of 
the September 2008 short selling ban.
Concluding comments
The important role of short selling continues to be supported by 
empirical evidence before and after the events of September 2008. 
Despite this, short sellers have been the scapegoats for the September 
2008 stock market sell-off of highly leveraged companies around the 
world. The short selling ban was imposed by government regulators 
on the basis of market manipulation, and prices did not reflect the 
true intrinsic value of these companies. At present, the burden of proof 
rests with government regulators in providing evidence to the public 
to support their claims. After the first anniversary of September 2008, 
we are still waiting for government regulators to empirically justify the 
policy decisions that resulted in these short selling bans.
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ASIC Should Extend its  
Short selling Ban, Not End It  
plus comments on the ‘tick’ rule, disclosure 
by shorts, and the conflict by fund 
managers in stock lending … 
John M. Green
Extend the short selling ban
Today, I call on ASIC (the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission) to extend its seven-week-old ban on the short selling of 
non-financial stocks. The ban is due to expire next week, 18 November 
2008. ASIC should extend the ban till late January, when its ban on 
shorting financial stocks is currently set to expire.
There are two reasons why an extension is warranted.
1. First, we need to see the final form of the government’s new short 
selling law. It will be tabled in parliament soon, but given the 
fatal flaws that festered in the old rules why shouldn’t we double-
check whether this new law can actually help avoid unforeseen 
consequences?
2. The second reason for extending the ban is because the extreme 
market volatility that led up to the ban and helped justify it has not 
abated. Stock prices can still see-saw on a single day by more than 
they would normally swing in a year.
Some see that intense volatility as evidence that the ban has made 
no difference and is thus a failure. I view it the opposite way: without 
the ban, the volatility and value destruction could have been far, far 
worse. Of course, neither view can actually be proven—show me a valid 
control group to benchmark against—I argue my cautious approach is 
more appropriate in the current environment.
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Some observe that those markets where there is no ban have survived 
without needing it. New Zealand is one example. But unlike Australia, 
New Zealand has no significant listed financial institutions whose 
primary listing is not Australian.
Short selling is not prima facie evil
Even so, like others here, I advocate the free-market view that short 
selling is not prima-facie evil; indeed that it is normally beneficial, 
providing the market with greater depth, liquidity, and finer pricing. 
In normal times, and even in especially buoyant times, short selling 
can be a considerable aid to market confidence and integrity because 
it helps dampen excessive exuberance, buy-side rumourtrage, and the 
manipulative practice of ‘pumping and dumping.’
Why a ban?
So how is it that not only do I support ASIC’s ban but argue for its 
extension?
Simply because I see short selling as good when it helps the market 
function efficiently and bad when it helps destroy confidence or when 
it has great potential to.
To me, short selling is like mowing lawns. In good times, cutting grass 
is highly beneficial. It cuts back exuberant spikes and wild runners. It also 
strengthens the underlying root system and builds greater lawn density to help 
endure poorer conditions should they come. But during a tough drought, the 
repeated mowing of dry, withered grass can kill it. A good measure becomes 
a bad one.
In a market context where rumour-mongering, panicked selling, 
a flight to cash, and a massive tsunami of global de-leveraging have 
shrivelled up buy-side liquidity, to give short sellers free rein to keep 
viciously slashing at the weakened grass with their machetes, destroying 
it when it sorely needs time to regenerate, is perverse.
Market interference
Much has been made of the fact that the short selling ban has caused 
major market interference. To that I offer two thoughts:
1. First, if ASIC had been surer-footed about this and had thought 
through all the issues well before that breathless panicked weekend 
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in late September, it could have introduced the ban with far less 
disruption or rule rewriting on the hop. (I for one advocated a 
temporary ban a full six months earlier, writing in the Australian 
Financial Review in March.)
2. Second, disruption to a segment of the market is always unfortunate, 
but before we get carried away let’s remember something: the role 
of short sellers is to serve the greater good of the market. I don’t see 
the market existing to serve short sellers.
Short sellers as messiahs
Those opposing the ban on short selling seem to have an unerring 
faith in the market judgments of short sellers as if they were seers or 
gods and that only through them and their good work shall we find 
ultimate market salvation and price discovery. People like those who 
famously shorted Enron have become global Jesus Christ figures who 
must apparently be right no matter what they say.
A common justification of those who believe in untrammelled short 
selling argue that movements in a company’s share price can’t bring that 
company down, unless that company was vulnerable to begin with.
It must be an exhilarating feeling to enjoy that sublime level of 
unshakeable faith in these shakily uncertain and intensely volatile times.
Consequences matter
But this religious conviction dismally fails to recognise that there is a 
gulf between a company being merely vulnerable and it deserving a 
sudden and violent death at the hands of short sellers.
In normal times, a vulnerable company will seek to reduce its 
susceptibility by recapitalising or by selling assets. Recapitalisation 
requires confidence from lenders and investors. When markets are 
so volatile even without short selling that banks and shareholders are 
conserving their cash, recapitalisation is hard enough. But when you 
torch the chances by firing a short selling missile and a few false rumours 
at a company’s heart, any negotiating position it has with potential asset 
buyers, or already nervous debt or equity providers, can disintegrate 
instantly. So yes, in those circumstances, vulnerability can mean death. 
But is that a death to be encouraged or tossed off lightly as creative 
destruction when it is not otherwise inevitable? I say not.
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While the shorts happily make a fast buck, the company goes to the 
wall, its creditors go unpaid and themselves become next in line in the 
cycle of vulnerable-means-death; the company’s employees lose their 
jobs just before Christmas; and its shareholders are also left out in the 
cold, many of them retirees who thought they’d planned well for their 
futures but who may become indigent, placing even greater burdens on 
already punch-drunk taxpayers.
To me, that’s not a price worth paying just so a few short sellers 
can add illusory liquidity to the market and so-called price discovery 
when right now, no one has a clue about price if they’re being honest 
with themselves. If ever there was a time when there was a disconnect 
between value and price, this is it. Short selling only widens the gulf in 
the absence of real buyer liquidity.
Government’s proposed new short selling law
Scandalously, the old short selling rules the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) had in place for years were being rorted daily. The 
government’s new law aims to fix this.
Until the recent ban, by simply borrowing stock short sellers could 
freely pretend they weren’t shorts and bear-raid every ASX-listed stock, 
even highly illiquid tiddlers the ASX specifically kept off its approved 
shorting list. Consequently, they could entirely mock the 10% shorting 
limit and dump as much stock as people were dumb enough to lend 
them; they could even sell into a plummeting market, forcing it down 
further and faster, casually waving aside the ‘tick’ rule that banned 
short selling at any price below the last sale. And shorts could do all 
this in private; they didn’t have to disclose a thing to the market.
Disclosure of shorting—when two weeks is too far
According to today’s Australian Financial Review, the Investment and 
Financial Services Association (IFSA) is unhappy with aspects of the 
government’s new law. IFSA apparently pans the government’s idea 
that shorts disclose their positions to the exchange within a day. Why? 
Because that would reveal shorts’ investment strategies. What? Shock, 
horror! The market might actually be informed about what shorts are 
doing? Longs might gang up on shorts for a change? Goodness me, 
I’m suffering palpitations for the short little bunnies. No, IFSA believes 
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shorts should only disclose only after two weeks which, according to 
them, is best practice in the world, including the United States.
Excuse me? Since when is the United States suddenly best practice 
in corporate disclosure and regulation? The same United States where 
companies only disclose quarterly and keep their shareholders largely in 
the dark the rest of the time?
If anywhere is best practice on disclosure, it is Australia where we 
have long had a system of continuous disclosure, a system the United 
States and others could do very well to emulate. And Mr Rudd and Mr 
Swan should say so at the G20 next week.
But no, IFSA apparently wants short sellers to be free to run rampant 
but in the shadows for two long excruciating weeks in an environment 
where the companies they aim to trash must disclose everything 
material instantly, not in two weeks, not in two days, but instantly. 
Even substantial shareholders on the buy-side must disclose within two 
days. Their investment strategies can’t be kept secret, so why should 
shorts be advantaged?
Now let’s look at two other issues the government has been 
surprisingly silent on.
1. The ‘tick’ rule
The ‘tick’ rule forbids shorting if a stock’s last price move was down. 
Prudently, the rule aims to prevent short sellers dumping shares into an 
already plummeting market.
If the so-called US best practice is a guide to what will happen here, 
it is a troubling one. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
abolished the tick rule there in July 2008, despite the New York Stock 
Exchange opposing the move. The SEC’s timing was exquisite, just 
moments before the angry bear started its global rampage when the rule 
would be needed most. Go figure.
Perhaps like a lamb to the slaughter, the ASX apparently wants the 
government to flick our tick rule, too. ASX’s October paper to the 
government on short selling casually asserts that Australia can ditch this 
rule ‘without having any adverse consequences.’
How many retirees whose superannuation has been slashed recently 
would embrace that plucky assertion for which ASX offers no evidence? 




2. ASIC must shine a bright light on stock-lending by ‘trusted’  
intermediaries
The second issue is the extraordinary market practice where investors’ 
‘trusted’ intermediaries—their fund managers, trustees and custodians—
casually lend their shares to short sellers.
On its face, doesn’t this seem like these managers are putting their 
clients’ best interests at severe risk?
Fuelling up short sellers with cheaply borrowed stock turbocharges 
the pressure they can drive down onto a market, accelerating the risk of 
those same shares plummeting.
Of course, if you lend your own personal stock for a fee, that’s one 
thing. It’s a free country. But this stock doesn’t belong to the managers 
and custodians who lend it, but to their clients who pay them good 
money to increase their wealth, not to destroy it.
Previously, short sellers were laughing. For the paltry few cents they 
paid these loopy intermediaries for this service, they could drive share 
prices down by dollars. Who drew the short straw on that rort? Hapless 
investors, that’s who.
Economist Stephen Kirchner, who disagrees with me, says:
It has also been suggested that fund managers who  
facilitate short selling by lending their securities are acting 
against the interests of their investors. Since fund managers 
attract and retain customers by maximising returns, 
it seems implausible they would knowingly facilitate 
transactions that reduce overall returns.
Let me give one example why this view, though tempting, is naive: 
index fund managers, a huge segment of the market. All an index fund 
manager cares about is trying to match the index and keeping costs low. 
Whether the index rises or falls is of zero consequence. So if an index 
fund can lend out stock even for a few cents to help offset their costs of 
mimicking the index, why wouldn’t they? The fact that stock-lending 
punishes their clients is irrelevant to them.
What ASIC should do now—before lifting the ban on short selling—




For example, ASIC could require all licensed intermediaries to 
disclose their answers to these five questions and post them on ASIC’s 
website for all investors, financial advisers, and media commentators 
to see:
• Does or will the fund manager engage in stock-lending to short 
sellers?
• Do intermediaries have their clients’ express permission to do so?
• Will the intermediary guarantee its investors that their stock-
borrowing short sellers will be solvent when they want their stock 
back?
• How much are the lending fees so investors can assess if the risks are 
worth it? and
• Who keeps the fees, the fund manager or the client?
If ASIC maintained this register on its website, it would have two 
benefits.
1. First, investors could access critical information needed to decide if 
they actually want to stay with a particular fund manager.
2. Further, the prospect of disclosure would have a chilling effect on 
this practice, with some intermediaries withdrawing from it rather 
than face public and media enquiry.
If your fund manager phoned up asking you to let them lend your 
stock to short sellers, would you agree? Or would you laugh hysterically 
into the handset for the few moments before you switched fund 
managers?
But the fund managers aren’t asking you, are they? ASIC should 




The short selling ban should not be permanent
My last point. Despite my call for the current ban to be extended, 
I agree short selling should not be banned permanently. When the grass 
is again resilient, short selling will be needed to strengthen it.
But that time has not arrived in Australia. Not yet. When will that 
be? I don’t know.
By advocating the ban be extended, does it mean that I’m setting 
up the regulators to engage in market timing? Unfortunately, there’s no 
other choice.
Will they get it wrong?
Probably, but that is a far less ugly outcome than the alternative.


